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CRIMINAL LAW
Marla Graff Decker *
Stephen R. McCullough **
I. INTRODUCTION
This article summarizes selected published decisions of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia, Virginia cases reviewed by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and decisions of the Court of Appeals
of Virginia issued between July 1, 2002 and July 1, 2003. The ar-
ticle also includes a summary of a few of the most relevant
changes to the criminal law enacted during that time by the Gen-
eral Assembly of Virginia. The sheer quantity of new cases and
statutes presents a significant challenge to the authors. We have
tried to select those most relevant to the practitioner; of necessity,
the discussion can highlight only a few of the most salient topog-
raphical changes to a complex landscape.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Fourth Amendment
1. Standing and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Standing is frequently an overlooked component of a Fourth
Amendment challenge. While the term "standing," in the context
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of standing to raise a claim, is often used for simplicity, as the
cases demonstrate, courts characterize the challenge in a more
detailed manner, taking into account both whether there is a sub-
jective reasonable expectation of privacy that society is willing to
recognize and whether the defendant actually exhibits an expec-
tation of privacy in the object.1 In any event, Virginia appellate
courts reviewed three cases that are worthy of discussion on this
issue.
In Bell v. Commonwealth,2 the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
sidered numerous challenges to the defendant's conviction for
capital murder of a police officer and to his sentence of death.3
One claim involved the search of a vehicle that had been used by
the defendant, but owned by another.4 On the morning prior to
the murder, the defendant parked the vehicle in a lot outside an
apartment building and abandoned it. 5 The manager of the build-
ing reported the abandoned vehicle, and the police arranged to
have it towed to the police station.6 During the process, the police
learned that a finance company had a lien on the car and that it
had been stolen from an "Impound Lot."7
The lien holder gave the police permission to search the vehi-
cle.' The defendant had possession of the car because he had bor-
rowed it from the owner's girlfriend and failed to return it, de-
spite her requests.9 The owner of the vehicle testified that he
never gave the defendant permission to use the car.1° The defen-
dant moved to suppress three bullets found inside the car, claim-
ing that the search was unlawful. The trial court ruled that the
defendant did not have standing to object to the search. 2 The
Supreme Court of Virginia found that the defendant failed to
meet his burden of proving that he had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the vehicle in order to confer standing to challenge
1. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 565, 576, 490 S.E.2d 274, 279 (Ct. App.
1997), affd 256 Va. 580, 507 S.E.2d 339 (1998).
2. 264 Va. 172, 563 S.E.2d 695 (2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 860 (2003).
3. Id. at 178, 183, 563 S.E.2d at 700-01, 703.
4. Id. at 189, 563 S.E.2d at 707-08.
5. Id. at 189, 563 S.E.2d at 707.
6. Id. at 189, 563 S.E.2d at 707-08.
7. Id. at 189, 563 S.E.2d at 708.
8. Id. at 189-90, 563 S.E.2d at 708.
9. Id. at 190, 563 S.E.2d at 708.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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the search. 13 The court pointed out that, in addition to the defen-
dant not being the owner of the car, he failed to establish that he
was authorized to have it in his possession at the time of the
search.14 Indeed, he left it at an apartment where he was not a
tenant.'" Moreover, at the time of the search, a lien holder was in
the process of repossessing the vehicle and gave police consent to
search it. 6 Thus, for all of these reasons, the supreme court found
that the trial court properly concluded that the defendant lacked
standing to challenge the search.17
In McCracken v. Commonwealth,"8 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, sitting en banc,-applying the principle that a trespasser
does not have a justifiable expectation of privacy in the home of
another-found that the defendant did not have standing to con-
test the sheriff department's entry into the home of his estranged
paramour. 9 The defendant lived with Theresa Fields ("Fields") in
her home for about three years prior to the incident.2" On the day
the sheriffs deputies entered Fields's home, she called the 911
emergency dispatcher twice." The first time, she reported that
she wanted the defendant removed from her home.22 Deputies ar-
rived at the residence and found the defendant arguing with
Fields.23 The defendant agreed to move out of the house and the
deputies remained to assist him in removing his belongings.24 The
defendant left to go to his mother's home.25 Later, after an argu-
ment with the defendant over the telephone, Fields again tele-
phoned the 911 emergency dispatcher and reported that she be-
lieved the defendant was returning to her home.26 The same two
deputies were dispatched back to Fields's residence. When they
arrived, neighbors alerted the deputies to the dispute inside.2"
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 39 Va. App. 254, 572 S.E.2d 493 (Ct. App. 2002).
19. Id. at 260, 572 S.E.2d at 496.
20. Id. at 258, 572 S.E.2d at 495.
21. Id. at 258-59, 572 S.E.2d at 495.
22. Id. at 258, 572 S.E.2d at 495.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 259, 572 S.E.2d at 495.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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The officers heard the defendant and Fields arguing inside the
house.29 The back door was locked.3' The front door was partially
open, but the screen door was closed.3 One of the deputies "drew
his weapon, pushed open the screen door, and entered" the resi-
dence.32 The defendant challenged the police entry and the subse-
quent search of his person-which he resisted.33
The court of appeals found that the police had probable cause
to believe that the defendant was trespassing before the officer
opened the screen door.34 However, the court also found that be-
cause the defendant was a trespasser, he had no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the residence and, consequently, had no
standing to challenge the entry.35
In the context of a very unique set of circumstances in Sheler v.
Commonwealth,36 the court of appeals considered whether the
trial court erred when it refused to suppress glass fragments
found on the defendant's shoes and clothing.37 The court of ap-
peals held that while the seizure of the defendant's person was
lawful, the police unlawfully searched the defendant's shoes and
the evidence should have been suppressed.38 The court was pre-
sented with an issue of first impression in Virginia-whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sole of
his shoe. The court of appeals, contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, found that the defendant had both an objective and subjec-
tive expectation of privacy in his shoes.40 First, the court found
that "an individual's expectation of privacy in his or her shoes is
an interest that society is willing to accept as reasonable."4' The
court opined that, much like with the garments one wears, an in-
dividual does not expect another to "manipulate" and "explore"
areas of his or her shoes that are not readily exposed to public
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 258, 572 S.E.2d at 495.
34. Id. at 260, 572 S.E.2d at 496.
35. Id.
36. 38 Va. App. 465, 566 S.E.2d 203 (Ct. App. 2002).
37. Id. at 468, 566 S.E.2d at 204.
38. Id. at 471, 566 S.E.2d at 206.
39. Id. at 475, 566 S.E.2d at 207-08.
40. Id. at 477, 566 S.E.2d at 208-09.
41. Id. at 477, 566 S.E.2d at 208.
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view.42 Second, the court found that, in this case, the defendant
had not exposed the soles of his shoes to the detective before the
detective asked to see the shoes. 3 Consequently, the defendant
also "exhibited a subjective expectation that the soles of his shoes
remain[ed] free from close inspection."44
2. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
a. Consensual Encounters and Consent
A consensual encounter between a citizen and a police officer
does not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 5 The Supreme Court of
Virginia reviewed two significant cases relating to the consensual
nature of an encounter.
In Dickerson v. Commonwealth,46 the court considered whether
an encounter after completion of a traffic stop constituted a con-
sensual encounter or a second seizure.47 This is the same type of
analysis the court was asked to conduct in Reittinger v. Com-
monwealth,4" where under a very different set of circumstances,
the court found that a second seizure had, in fact, occurred. 9 In
Dickerson, a police officer received a radio dispatch that a particu-
lar vehicle with a particular license plate number had failed to
yield the right of way to an ambulance. ° The officer saw the vehi-
cle traveling sixty-five miles-per-hour in a fifty-five miles-per-
hour zone.51 He activated his emergency lights and siren and
stopped the speeding car.52 The defendant was the driver of the
42. Id. at 477, 566 S.E.2d at 208-09.
43. Id. at 477, 566 S.E.2d at 209.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2002) (stating that the
police do not contravene the Fourth Amendment "merely by approaching individuals on
the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to lis-
ten .... If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she
has not been seized.").
46. 266 Va. 14, 581 S.E.2d 195 (2003).
47. Id. at 16, 581 S.E.2d at 196.
48. 260 Va. 232, 532 S.E.2d 25 (2000).
49. Id. at 237, 532 S.E.2d at 28.
50. Dickerson, 266 Va. at 16, 581 S.E.2d at 196.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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vehicle.53 The officer noticed an odor of alcohol about the defen-
dant's person and asked him to get out of the car.54 The officer
then conducted field sobriety tests. After the tests, the officer
decided not to arrest the defendant for any alcohol related of-
fenses.56 The officer told the defendant that "he was free to go but
that he might be subpoenaed later for the failure-to-yield traffic
infraction."57
The defendant returned to his car, opened the driver's door,
and started to get back into the car. 5 The officer asked him, "'if
there was anything in the car [he] should know about, dope, mari-
juana, roaches in the ashtray, something, anything like that.' 59
Dickerson responded, "no.' 60 The officer asked him if he smoked
marijuana.6' The defendant said that he did, "but not while he
was driving."62 Dickerson told the officer that there was some
marijuana in the ashtray. The officer asked the defendant if he
could search the car.64 Dickerson refused to permit the search, but
removed the ashtray from the car's console and handed it to the
officer.6 5 The ashtray contained "'numerous hand-rolled cigarette
roaches"' which the defendant spontaneously identified as mari-
juana cigarettes.66 The officer asked a second time for permission
to search the car.6" Dickerson again refused, but the officer told
him to step away from the vehicle and then began to search it.6" A
quantity of cocaine and two sets of scales were found in the car.69
The officer arrested the defendant, who was later charged with
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.7 ° The trial court
denied Dickerson's motion to suppress the evidence and
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (alteration in original).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 17, 581 S.E.2d at 196.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Dickerson was convicted of the offense.71 The court of appeals af-
firmed the conviction, finding no Fourth Amendment violation.72
The supreme court agreed and found that, based on the totality
of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed
that the traffic stop had ended and that he was free to leave at
the time of the questions by the officer.73 The court reasoned that
not only had the officer told the defendant that he was free to go,
but also that the defendant had returned to his car and had be-
gun to get inside, demonstrating his knowledge that the traffic
stop was over.74 Further, the officer's "questions sought informa-
tion and did not implicate restraint or the need to restrain" the
defendant." Dickerson responded to the questions by freely stat-
ing that he used marijuana and actually showing the officer what
he admitted were remnants of marijuana cigarettes in the ash-
tray.76 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the facts
supported a seizure, recognizing that, despite the presence of two
armed officers, the officers did not block the defendant's access to
his car, nor did they prevent him from leaving after the traffic
stop.77 Citing the recent decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States in United States v. Drayton,7" the Supreme Court of
Virginia noted that the mere presence of uniformed, armed offi-
cers does not transform an otherwise consensual encounter into a
seizure." The court concluded that the encounter following the
traffic stop was consensual and the evidence was lawfully admit-
ted at trial.8 0
In another case, decided the same day as Dickerson, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia reached a very different result. In Harris
v. Commonwealth,"1 the court found that a seizure that continued
after the basis for a legitimate traffic stop had expired was
unlawful.82 In this case, an officer initiated a traffic stop for a bro-
ken license plate light that he observed on a truck driven by the
71. Id. at 17, 581 S.E.2d at 196-97.
72. Id. at 17, 581 S.E.2d at 197.
73. Id. at 17-18, 581 S.E.2d at 197.
74. Id. at 18, 581 S.E.2d at 197.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
79. Dickerson, 266 Va. at 18, 581 S.E.2d at 197.
80. Id. at 19, 581 S.E.2d at 198.
81. 266 Va. 28, 581 S.E.2d 206 (2003).
82. Id. at 33, 581 S.E.2d at 210.
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defendant.8 3 The officer stopped the truck occupied by the defen-
dant and a passenger.84 A second officer arrived and both marked
police vehicles remained on the scene with their emergency lights
activated. 5 The officer who initiated the stop asked Harris for his
license and vehicle registration. 6 The defendant produced his so-
cial security card and told the officer that he knew he had been
stopped because he had no license plate light.8 7 The officer told
the defendant to get out of the truck and asked the defendant
questions to confirm his identity.8 Using his hand-held radio, the
officer then provided his dispatcher with the social security num-
ber.89 The dispatcher advised the officer of Harris's identity and
that he had a valid Virginia driver's license.9 ° The police officer
returned the defendant's social security card and did not issue a
summons;9' however, he asked Harris if he had anything illegal
in the truck or on his person.92 The defendant stated that he did
not.93 The officer then asked if he could search the truck.94 The de-
fendant consented to the search.9" The officer ultimately found
stolen property inside the vehicle.96 At no time prior to the search
did the police tell Harris or the passenger that they were free to
leave, nor did the officer ever tell the defendant that he was not
going to be issued a summons for the traffic offense.
The supreme court found that the reasonable articulable suspi-
cion to support the traffic stop ended when the officer returned
the social security card to the defendant, and the traffic stop was
over.98 Thus, in order to have been lawful, the continuation of the
encounter would have had to have been consensual.99 The su-
preme court, disagreeing with the court of appeals and the trial
83. Id. at 30, 581 S.E.2d at 208.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 31, 581 S.E.2d at 208.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 33, 581 S.E.2d at 210.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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court, found that it was not.' ° Under the circumstances of the
case, the supreme court found it significant that, when the officer
returned the social security card to the defendant, he did not tell
the defendant that he was not going to issue a summons, nor did
he tell the defendant that he was free to leave. 10' Instead, the offi-
cer immediately began to ask questions and asked for permission
to search the truck.0 2 The court noted that the defendant knew
he had committed a traffic offense and was aware that he did not
provide the officer with a license and registration when asked to
do so.' 0 ' The officer did nothing to indicate that the defendant was
no longer being detained for a traffic violation when he began
asking questions.' 4 Instead, the court noted, the defendant re-
mained in the presence of two armed, uniformed officers and two
police vehicles with emergency lights flashing.'0 ' Under these cir-
cumstances, the court found that no reasonable person would
have felt free to leave or free to refuse to answer the officer's
questions.10 6 Consequently, the encounter was not consensual, but
was a seizure that was not supported by independent reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.' The court further held that the de-
fendant's consent to the search was the product of an illegal sei-
zure and was not the result of "an independent act of free will."'0°
Thus, the consent was involuntary and the evidence should have
been suppressed.' 9
The Court of Appeals of Virginia has also decided several con-
sensual encounter cases this year. Inasmuch as Fourth Amend-
ment analysis-including whether the protection applies at all-
is extremely dependent on the facts of the case, this is a highly
litigated issue resulting in many published and unpublished deci-
sions.
One case that is worthy of discussion is Barkley v. Common-
wealth.' ° This case involves what is commonly referred to as a
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 31, 581 S.E.2d at 208.
103. Id. at 33, 581 S.E.2d at 210.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 34, 581 S.E.2d at 210.
109. Id. at 34, 581 S.E.2d at 210-11.
110. 39 Va. App. 682, 576 S.E.2d 234 (Ct. App. 2003).
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"knock and talk."11' It also involves a consensual encounter that
begins on a porch and extends into a residence." 2 In Barkley, two
police officers, one in uniform and the other in plain clothes, went
to a residence to investigate a "'Crime Stoppers' tip."" 3 Specifi-
cally, the information provided in the tip was "that male and fe-
male juveniles ... were using and selling marijuana and cocaine"
at that apartment."4 An officer knocked on the apartment door
and the male defendant answered." 5 The male defendant went
out onto the porch with the police and asked how he could help
them."6 One of the officers told the defendant that they were
there to "'investigate a complaint on the residence ... the build-
ing itself or the home itself.""' 7 The officer explained that the de-
fendant was not under arrest but that the police had received a
tip that there was possible illegal activity going on at the resi-
dence-particularly involving the sale and use of illegal narcot-
ics."' In an abundance of caution, the officer then advised the de-
fendant of his Miranda"9 rights. 2 ° Barkley acknowledged that he
understood his rights and admitted that he smoked marijuana,
but claimed that no one sold drugs from the residence.' 2'
While the defendant spoke with the police on the porch, several
individuals passed by the apartment.'22 The defendant told the
police that the neighbors were "nosey-'' 123 In response, one of the
officers suggested that they all go inside the apartment. 24
Barkley led the officers inside to his bedroom, which was also
used as a den.'25 The primary officer continued to explain the
purpose of their presence and again asked the defendant if he
111. See, e.g., Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 289 (4th Cir. 2001) (defining the right
to "knock and talk" as the right "to knock on a residence's door or otherwise approach the
residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants").
112. Barkley, 39 Va. App. at 688, 576 S.E.2d at 237.
113. Id. at 687-88, 576 S.E.2d at 236-237.
114. Id. at 687-88, 576 S.E.2d at 237.
115. Id. at 688, 576 S.E.2d at 237.
116. Id.
117. Id. (alteration in original).
118. Id.
119. The Supreme Court of the United States first identified a suspect's rights during
police questioning in the case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
120. Barkley, 39 Va. App. at 688, 576 S.E.2d at 237.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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was aware of any illegal activity in the residence. 126 During the
conversation, both officers noticed the remains of a marijuana
cigarette in an ashtray. 127 They brought the marijuana to
Barkley's attention and again advised him of his Miranda
rights. 2 ' The defendant reiterated that he occasionally smoked
marijuana and removed a bag of marijuana from his dresser. 129
The officer asked if he could search the apartment. 130 In response,
the defendant asked if he was required to permit a search.'3 ' The
officer explained that the defendant could refuse to provide his
permission, but that based upon observations by the officers, they
could obtain a search warrant for the premises.'32 The defendant
reluctantly gave his permission, suggesting that they would
probably search the apartment regardless of what he said.'33 The
officer explained a second time that Barkley could refuse to allow
the search and no search would be conducted without his consent
or a warrant. 134 The defendant provided his consent, yet the offi-
cer continued to ask questions to ensure that the consent was
voluntary. 135 Ultimately, the police went forward with a search
based on the defendant's consent and discovered over a pound of
marijuana. 136
The court of appeals found that the conduct of the officers did
not convert the otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure."'
Contrary to the defendant's claim, the court found that the offi-
cers did not identify the defendant as the target of a criminal in-
vestigation, but instead told him that they were investigating
complaints about illegal activities at that residence. 3 ' The court
noted that the explanation of the officers' presence, combined
with the fact that they informed him that he was not under ar-
rest, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he was not
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 688-89, 576 S.E.2d at 237.
131. Id. at 689, 576 S.E.2d at 237.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 693, 576 S.E.2d at 239.
138. Id.
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being detained.'39 Further, the court found that under the totality
of the circumstances, the officers' conduct did not suggest a
"'threatening presence' so as to create a seizure. 4 ° The officers
did not display their weapons and the atmosphere remained cas-
ual throughout the encounter.' 4 ' The tone of the interview was
relaxed and non-accusatory.' The court of appeals rejected the
defendant's argument that when the police advised him of his
Miranda rights, the encounter turned into a seizure."' The court
noted that the record shows that the officers advised the defen-
dant of his rights merely as a matter of caution.'" Thus, the court
concluded that the defendant voluntarily consented to the police
entering his residence. 4 ' Likewise, the court found that he con-
sented to a search of his apartment during a continued consen-
sual encounter with the police. 4 '
Consent to search is another similar area of analysis that can-
not be overlooked when dealing with the Fourth Amendment. Of-
ten times, consent to search goes hand-in-hand with a consensual
encounter. However, an individual may also voluntarily consent
to a search during a seizure.'47 In short, consent is frequently an
issue raised in connection with a Fourth Amendment challenge to
a conviction.
One recent decision by the Court of Appeals of Virginia relating
to consent is significant. In Edwards v. Commonwealth, 48 the
court of appeals analyzed the scope of a defendant's consent to a
search of his "person."'49 The police knew through an informant
that two individuals, one of whom was known as "E," were selling
narcotics from a particular room in a specific Econo Lodge.'
When the police arrived at the room, the defendant was not pre-
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 694, 576 S.E.2d at 240.
142. Id. at 695, 576 S.E.2d at 240.
143. Id. at 694, 576 S.E.2d at 240.
144. Id. at 695, 576 S.E.2d at 240.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946) (analyzing all of the
circumstances and determining that a filling station operator acted consensually when he
unlocked a door where agents found contraband).
148. 38 Va. App. 823, 568 S.E.2d 454 (Ct. App. 2002).
149. Id. at 828, 568 S.E.2d at 457.
150. Id. at 826, 568 S.E.2d at 456.
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sent and an occupant gave the officer permission to search.15' The
defendant knocked on the door and entered the room where the
police were conducting the search for illegal drugs.152 He identi-
fied himself as "E."'58 One of the officers told the defendant that
he understood that the defendant was a supplier of cocaine to a
variety of locations, including locations at that motel.'54 The offi-
cer then asked him for consent to search his person.'55 At the
time, Edwards was holding a clear plastic bag of women's white
tube socks.'56 He agreed to the search, stating '"[s]ure, no prob-
lem."'157 He then put the bag of socks down on a nearby bed and
cooperated with the search.' 8 The officer searched the defendant
but did not find narcotics.'59 The officer then picked up the bag of
socks from the bed, asked the defendant what he was doing with
a bag of women's socks, and immediately noticed a lumpy object
in the bag.6 ° He looked inside the bag and found two plastic
sandwich bags containing cocaine.' 6 '
The question before the court of appeals, a matter of first im-
pression in Virginia, was whether the defendant's consent to a
search of his "person" extended to the bag he was holding when
he provided his voluntary consent. 62 The court found "that the
scope of consent to search one's person encompasses such
items." 63 It noted that at the time Edwards agreed to the search,
"the bag [of socks] was 'appended to,' or intimately connected
with, his person." 64 Also, the defendant knew that "the object of
the search was evidence related to cocaine distribution, which
could possibly be found within the bag." 65 Finally, the court ad-
dressed Edwards' placement of the bag on the bed after he con-
sented to the search.' 66 It stated that Edwards' "passive acquies-
151. See id.; see also id. at 839, 568 S.E.2d at 462 (Elder, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 826, 568 S.E.2d at 456.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (alteration in original).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 828, 568 S.E.2d at 457.
163. Id. at 829, 568 S.E.2d at 457.
164. Id. at 830, 568 S.E.2d at 457.
165. Id. at 830, 568 S.E.2d at 458.
166. Id.
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cence while the officer searched the bag affirmed that the bag was
within the scope of his consent."167 Based upon all of the circum-
stances, the court found that a reasonable officer would believe
that the defendant's consent to search his person included con-
sent to search the bag.
168
b. Inventory Search
In King v. Commonwealth,69 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
determined whether the police lawfully impounded the defen-
dant's vehicle and, if so, whether the warrantless search of that
vehicle was authorized as an inventory search. 7 ° Applying an ob-
jective standard, the court found that the facts did not support
the conclusion that the impoundment of the defendant's vehicle
was intended to prevent a public safety risk or to safeguard the
vehicle-the two bases for impoundment.' 7 ' The court noted that
the car was properly parked and did not obstruct the flow of traf-
fic. "'72 Nor was it trespassing on private property or violating any
parking ordinances. 17 3 The record demonstrated that the police
failed to inquire as to the defendant's ability to make arrange-
ments for the car to be moved.'74 Moreover, there was no evidence
that the defendant had property inside the car that would have
been subject to vandalism. 7 ' Finally, the defendant was not being
arrested, unlike other situations where a vehicle is impounded.'76
Based on these facts, the court of appeals found that the im-
poundment was an unlawful seizure and did not fall within the
"community caretaker" exception to the warrant requirement.'77
167. Id.
168. Id. at 831, 568 S.E.2d at 458.
169. 39 Va. App. 306, 572 S.E.2d 518 (Ct. App. 2002).
170. Id. at 311, 572 S.E.2d at 520.
171. Id. at 311-12, 572 S.E.2d at 521.
172. Id. at 312, 572 S.E.2d at 521.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 310-14, 572 S.E.2d at 520-22.
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3. Reasonable Suspicion
A major consideration in Fourth Amendment analysis relating
to stops and seizures is whether the police officer possessed a
"reasonable, articulable suspicion" of criminal activity, so as to
justify a stop or seizure. 178 A few cases decided this past year are
worth noting in this area.
In Whitfield v. Commonwealth,'79 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia found that the police had reasonable suspicion to believe
that the defendant might be engaged in criminal activity when
they stopped him.8 ° At 3:30 a.m., in a high crime area, the defen-
dant appeared to be trespassing on private property near an
abandoned building.' When the initial officer shined the police
car's floodlight in the direction of the defendant, the defendant
ran.l8 2 The defendant continued to run away as a second officer
arrived and joined the pursuit.8 3 The defendant was ultimately
caught when he could not escape over a high fence.8 4 Relying, in
part, on the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Illi-
nois v. Wardlow,"'8 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that
the "characteristics of the area" in conjunction with the defen-
dant's behavior when the police arrived, which "includ[ed] his
unprovoked flight, justified the stop, and further [police] investi-
gation."'8 6
In Alston v. Commonwealth,"7 the police had reasonable articu-
lable suspicion to believe that the passenger of a vehicle had
committed a crime.88 While following the car, police noticed that
the driver negotiated the vehicle in an evasive manner, then
stopped the vehicle, and abruptly exited the car.8 9 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia held that under these circumstances, the po-
178. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) (applying the concept
first addressed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)).
179. 265 Va. 358, 576 S.E.2d 463 (2003).
180. Id. at 361-62, 576 S.E.2d at 465.
181. Id. at 362, 576 S.E.2d at 465.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
186. Whitfield, 265 Va. at 362, 576 S.E.2d at 465.
187. 40 Va. App. 728, 581 S.E.2d 245 (Ct. App. 2003).
188. Id. at 733-34, 581 S.E.2d at 248.
189. Id. at 740, 581 S.E.2d at 251.
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lice can order the driver back into the vehicle for the duration of
the investigatory stop.
190
4. Probable Cause and Searches Incident to Arrest
In Slayton v. Commonwealth, 9' the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia reiterated the well-established standard for probable
cause.192 It also made clear that "even though probable cause [re-
quires] more than a 'mere suspicion [of criminal activity],' it is not
necessary for the facts to be 'sufficient to convict' the accused of
the offense."'93 The court further noted that as long as the officer
has objective probable cause to arrest the defendant for one of-
fense at the time of the search, it is legally irrelevant that he ul-
timately arrests him for a different offense.
9 4
5. Scope of Search
In Murphy v. Commonwealth,9' the Supreme Court of Virginia
had an opportunity to determine the scope of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Minnesota v. Dickerson.'96
In Murphy, the police executed a search warrant at a residence
where the defendant was present. 97 The warrant authorized a
search of the residence for guns, drugs, and related items.9 ' It
also authorized police to search a named person, who was not the
defendant.'99 When the police entered the house, they ordered the
defendant to lie down on the floor.200 They handcuffed the defen-
dant and frisked him for weapons.2 1 During the frisk for weap-
ons, the officer "felt a bulge in the left front pocket of [the defen-
dant's] pants, and sensed that the object was a 'plastic baggy.' 20 2
190. Id. at 739-40, 581 S.E.2d at 251.
191. 41 Va. App. 101, 582 S.E.2d 448 (Ct. App. 2003).
192. Id. at 106, 582 S.E.2d at 450.
193. Id. at 107, 582 S.E.2d at 451 (quoting Gomez v. Atkins, 296 F.3d 253, 262 (4th Cir.
2002)).
194. Id. at 109, 582 S.E.2d at 452.
195. 264 Va. 568, 570 S.E.2d 836 (2002).
196. 508 U.S. 366(1993).
197. Murphy, 264 Va. at 571, 570 S.E.2d at 837.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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Based upon his training and experience, the officer concluded
that the bag contained marijuana. 2°3 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reversed the defendant's conviction, finding that the officer
exceeded the scope of a protective frisk for weapons.2 °4 It opined
that the officer did not testify that his sense of touch prompted
him to conclude that the object was a weapon, nor did he state
that it was "immediately apparent" to him once he touched the
object that it was marijuana.2"' The court pointed out that all the
officer could say based upon his sense of touch was that the object
was a plastic bag.20 6 The belief that it contained marijuana was
based on his training and experience after feeling the bag.20 7
Thus, the court concluded that the information provided by the
officer's sense of touch was insufficient under Dickerson to estab-
lish probable cause to go beyond the frisk and conduct a search.208
In Craddock v. Commonwealth, °9 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia combined an analysis of Virginia law relating to strip
searches and the Supreme Court of the United States' standard
for searching detainees210 to determine whether the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights were violated.21' The court looked at
the "'scope of the particular intrusion' and the "'manner' in which
the search was conducted" and determined that the defendant's
rights were not violated.212 The court of appeals agreed with the
trial court that the facts supported the conclusion that the search
was a strip search rather than a body cavity search.21 '3 The officer
saw the bag between the defendant's buttocks before the police
found it necessary to physically pry his legs apart to remove it.2"4
Further, the court determined that the "manner" in which the
search was accomplished was reasonable. 2 5 The officers removed
the defendant's clothing in an isolated holding cell and did not in-
203. Id.
204. Id. at 574, 570 S.E.2d at 839.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 40 Va. App. 539, 580 S.E.2d 454 (Ct. App. 2003).
210. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-59 (1979) (discussing the test of reason-
ableness under the Fourth Amendment for detainee searches).
211. Craddock, 40 Va. App. at 547, 580 S.E.2d at 458.
212. Id. at 550-51, 580 S.E.2d at 460 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 559).
213. Id. at 550, 580 S.E.2d at 460.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 551, 580 S.E.2d at 460.
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trude into any body cavity.216 Thus, the search of the detainee was
lawful.217
In Kidd v. Commonwealth,218 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered the constitutionality of a strip search that followed a
protective frisk for weapons and the defendant's consent.219 The
initial frisk focused on the defendant's crotch, where the officer
had seen an unnatural bulge.22 ° When he felt an object with a
hard edge, the officer pulled the defendant's sweatpants away
from his body to look down in that area.221 The officer saw a
change purse, which he removed. 222 The defendant told the officer
"'that's all I've got, you can check me.' 223 In response, the officer
pulled back the sweatpants as well as the defendant's boxer
shorts, exposing a plastic baggie of cocaine.224 The court of ap-
peals opined that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily au-
thorized the search.225
6. Use of Force To Resist an Illegal Seizure
Virginia courts have held that a defendant is permitted to use
reasonable force to resist an illegal arrest.226 In Commonwealth v.
Hill,227 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that this right
did not extend to the use of force to resist an illegal detention.228
In Hill, the officer illegally detained the suspect based upon an
insufficient tip and then tried to conduct a frisk.229 In response,
the suspect punched the officer in the face and proceeded to fight
with three officers.230 The police subdued Hill and, following a
216. Id.
217. Id. at 552, 580 S.E.2d at 461.
218. 38 Va. App. 433, 565 S.E.2d 337 (Ct. App. 2002).
219. Id. at 441, 565 S.E.2d at 341.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 447, 565 S.E.2d at 344.
226. See, e.g., Banner v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 640, 646-47, 133 S.E.2d 305, 309-10
(1963).
227. 264 Va. 541, 570 S.E.2d 805 (2002).
228. Id. at 546, 570 S.E.2d at 808.
229. Id. at 544-46, 570 S.E.2d at 806-08.
230. Id. at 544, 570 S.E.2d at 806.
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search, discovered cocaine on his person." 1 He claimed that be-
cause his detention was illegal, he was permitted to use force.232
The supreme court disagreed, holding that in contrast to an ar-
rest, "a detention is, by its nature, a brief intrusion on an individ-
ual's liberty."233 Permitting the use of force in such situations, the
court concluded, "would only serve to increase the danger of vio-
lence inherent in such detentions."234
B. Fifth and Sixth Amendment
1. Double Jeopardy
In Neff v. Commonwealth,235 the defendant was convicted in the
general district court of driving under the influence ("D.U.I.") and
he appealed to the circuit court.236 While that appeal was pend-
ing, Neff was charged with a second offense D.U.I. 237 Prior to trial
in the general district court on the second D.U.I. charge, the
Commonwealth moved for a continuance.238 The court refused to
grant the continuance and further denied a motion for a nolle
prosequi.239 The prosecution declined to present any evidence and
the charge was dismissed.2 ° The Commonwealth later directly
indicted Neff in the circuit court for the D.U.I., second offense,
and he was convicted in that court.241 The Court of Appeals of
Virginia rejected Neff's arguments that either double jeopardy or
res judicata barred the conviction in circuit court.242 Jeopardy had
not attached because no witnesses were sworn and no evidence
was presented. 243 Res judicata did not apply since the dismissal in
general district court was not based on the merits of the case; in-
stead, "'[it was the equivalent of a nolle prosequi [that did] not'
231. Id.
232. Id. at 546, 570 S.E.2d at 807.
233. Id. at 548, 570 S.E.2d at 808.
234. Id. at 548, 570 S.E.2d at 809.
235. 39 Va. App. 13, 569 S.E.2d 72 (Ct. App. 2002).
236. Id. at 15, 569 S.E.2d at 73.
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. Id. at 15-16, 569 S.E.2d at 73-74.
240. Id. at 16, 569 S.E.2d at 74.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 17, 569 S.E.2d at 74.
243. Id.
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actually or constructively establish the guilt or innocence of the
accused."2
In Ragsdale v. Commonwealth,245 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia considered whether carnal knowledge of a child was a
lesser-included offense of rape.246 The defendant had originally
been charged with rape.247 However, he was not brought to trial
in a timely manner under the speedy trial statute and this charge
was dismissed.24  The Commonwealth proceeded to indict
Ragsdale for carnal knowledge.249 In response, Ragsdale claimed
that this second prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.5 The court analyzed the elements of the two offenses
under the Blockburger251 test to determine "'whether each [statu-
tory] provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not."'25 2 The court of appeals concluded that rape requires proof of
sexual intercourse and the use of force, which are not required in
a prosecution for carnal knowledge.2"3 A prosecution for carnal
knowledge requires proof that the victim is between thirteen and
fifteen years old, an element not found in a prosecution for
rape.254 Therefore, while the Commonwealth could not proceed
with a prosecution for rape, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not
preclude Ragsdale's conviction for carnal knowledge of a minor.255
2. Statutory Double Jeopardy
With the ever-growing federalization of criminal law as a back-
drop, the court of appeals in Londono v. Commonwealth256 exam-
ined the scope of the statutory double jeopardy provision in Vir-
244. Id. at 20, 569 S.E.2d at 76 (quoting Ward v. Reasor, 98 Va. 399, 403, 36 S.E. 470,
471 (1900)).
245. 38 Va. App. 421, 565 S.E.2d 331 (Ct. App. 2002).
246. Id. at 424-25, 565 S.E.2d at 333. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (Repl. Vol.
1996), with VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
247. Ragsdale, 38 Va. App. at 424, 565 S.E.2d at 333.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 425, 565 S.E.2d at 333.
251. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303 (1932).
252. Ragsdale, 38 Va. App. at 427, 565 S.E.2d at 334 (quoting Dalo v. Commonwealth,
37 Va. App. 156, 162, 554 S.E.2d 705, 708 (Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted)).
253. Id. at 428, 565 S.E.2d at 335.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 428-29, 565 S.E.2d at 335.
256. 40 Va. App. 377, 579 S.E.2d 641 (Ct. App. 2003).
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ginia Code section 19.2-294.57 The defendant was originally
charged in federal court with conspiracy to distribute heroin and
possession with the intent to distribute.2 8 However, the United
States District Court granted a motion to suppress. 259 Londono
was then charged and eventually convicted in state court for
transporting heroin into the Commonwealth and for conspiracy.26 °
The court, in affirming the convictions, first noted that Virginia
Code section 19.2-294 bars prosecutions based on a prior prosecu-
tion for the "same act."26 1 To determine whether the two prosecu-
tions involved the same act, the Court must examine "'whether
the same evidence is required to sustain them.'262 The Court held
that proof of the state charges required different evidence from
that required to prove the federal charges.2" Finally, the court re-
jected the application of collateral estoppel based on the suppres-
sion motion in federal court.2" The court held that there was no
evidence that the Commonwealth was a party to the federal pro-
ceeding or that it exercised any control over that prosecution.265
Conversely, no evidence showed that the federal prosecutors in-
duced or controlled the state prosecution.266
3. Right to Counsel
In Commonwealth v. Redmond,267 the Commonwealth asked
the Supreme Court of Virginia to find that the court of appeals
had not sufficiently deferred to the trial court's factual findings
concerning the defendant's invocation of his right to counsel dur-
257. Id. at 392-93, 579 S.E.2d at 698. Virginia Code section 19.2-294, which was sub-
sequently amended, provided that "if the same act be a violation of both a state and a fed-
eral statute a prosecution under the federal statute shall be a bar to a prosecution under
the state statute." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
258. Londono, 40 Va. App. at 389, 579 S.E.2d at 647.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 391, 579 S.E.2d at 648.
261. Id. at 392-93, 579 S.E.2d at 648.
262. Id. at 393, 579 S.E.2d at 649 (quoting Treu v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 996,
997, 406 S.E.2d 676, 677 (Ct. App. 1991)); see also Estes v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 23, 24,
181 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1971); Hundley v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 449, 451, 69 S.E.2d 336,
337 (1952).
263. Londono, 40 Va. App. at 395, 579 S.E.2d at 650.
264. Id. at 406, 579 S.E.2d at 655.
265. Id. at 405, 579 S.E.2d at 654.
266. Id.
267. 264 Va. 321, 568 S.E.2d 695 (2002).
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ing a custodial interrogation.2 68 The supreme court disagreed,
holding that invocations of the right to counsel are legal issues, to
be resolved de novo on appeal.2 69 However, the appellate court
will review a trial court's "findings of historical fact only for clear
error,.. . giv[ing] due weight to inferences drawn from those fac-
tual findings."27 ° The supreme court did not agree with the gov-
ernment's argument that the police interrogation must be viewed
in its entirety, including statements made after a purported re-
quest for counsel, in determining whether the defendant made a
clear assertion of his right to counsel.271 The court said that
statements made after the purported invocation of the right to
counsel are not relevant. 2 The court ultimately concluded that
the defendant did not make a clear and unambiguous assertion of
his right to counsel when he stated "'[c]an I speak to my lawyer? I
can't even talk to [a] lawyer before I make any kinds of comments
or anything?' 273
The Supreme Court of Virginia reaffirmed the "offense specific"
feature of the right to counsel in Alston v. Commonwealth."4 Al-
ston was arrested in connection with a burglary of the One Stop
Pet Shop.275 Counsel was appointed by the court and the defen-
dant was remanded to the jail. 6 While Alston was incarcerated,
a detective spoke with him concerning several burglaries, includ-
ing one at the Tidewater Feed and Seed store.277 At the time,
Alston had not been charged with burglarizing that store.2 78 Dur-
ing this interview, the defendant confessed to the burglary at the
Feed and Seed store.2 79 He sought to suppress this statement, ar-
guing that the invocation of his right to counsel for one burglary
applied to the other burglary which was "so closely related in
place, time, and modus operandi as to make the interrogation in
the Feed and Seed case 'a part and parcel of a single prosecu-
268. Id. at 326, 568 S.E.2d at 697.
269. Id. at 326, 568 S.E.2d at 697-98.
270. Id. at 327, 568 S.E.2d at 698.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 330, 568 S.E.2d at 700 (second alteration in original).
274. 264 Va. 433, 437, 570 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2002).
275. Id. at 435, 570 S.E.2d at 804.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 435-36, 570 S.E.2d at 802.
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tion. '' 2"° The court held that the defendant suffered no violation of
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.2"' The court reasoned that
the burglaries were separate offenses, committed at different
times and against different victims, and the connection between
the two was, in fact, minimal.28 2 The court also noted that the
statement was only used against him in the prosecution for bur-
glarizing the Feed and Seed store.8 3
III. SPECIFIC CRIMES
A. Assault and Battery
Over the years, the General Assembly has steadily increased
the categories of persons protected by an enhanced penalty under
the assault and battery statute, Virginia Code section 18.2-
57(B).2"4 Racially motivated attacks, for example, are now pun-
ished more harshly under other provisions of the Virginia Code.28 5
In Carfagno v. Commonwealth, s6 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the trial court properly concluded that the use of racial
slurs before and during a battery constituted sufficient circum-
stantial evidence that the attack was racially motivated.2 7
B. Forging Public Documents
The defendant in Hines v. Commonwealth.. was convicted of
five separate counts of forging a public document.2 9 Hines had
signed his brother's name and provided his brother's birth date
and social security number for five summonses that were issued
following one traffic stop.2 90 He argued that the single larceny
280. Id. at 437, 570 S.E.2d at 804.
281. Id. at 438, 570 S.E.2d at 804.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003). This section of the Virginia Code
raises the penalty from a Class 1 misdemeanor to a Class 6 felony for certain assaults or
batteries. Id.
285. See id.
286. 39 Va. App. 718, 576 S.E.2d 765 (Ct. App. 2003).
287. Id. at 725, 576 S.E.2d at 768.
288. 39 Va. App. 752, 576 S.E.2d 781 (Ct. App. 2003).
289. Id. at 753, 576 S.E.2d at 782.
290. Id. at 754, 576 S.E.2d at 782.
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doctrine, which permits only a single conviction for larceny where
several items are taken at the same time,29' should be expanded
to cover the five forged summonses.292 Hines noted that the for-
geries stemmed from a single intent to avoid the outstanding
warrants.293 The court disagreed.294 Relying on the plain language
of the public documents forgery statute, the difference between
larceny and forgery, and the narrow interpretation given to the
single larceny doctrine, the court affirmed Hines's five separate
convictions .295
C. Concealing Merchandise
In Hulcher v. Commonwealth,296 the defendant challenged his
conviction for concealing or taking possession of merchandise.297
He argued that the stolen items--display boxes that were not for
sale-did not constitute "goods or merchandise" under Virginia
Code section 18.2-103.29" The court of appeals affirmed his convic-
tion, holding that the statute does not require that the merchan-
dise be for sale.299
D. Construction Fraud
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Holsapple v. Common-
wealth, °° clarified a number of issues relating to prosecutions for
fraudulently obtaining an advance of payment for construction
work. 30 ' First, the court held that the Commonwealth must prove
that the victim sent notice by certified mail and requested a re-
turn receipt.3 2 However, the statute does not require the defen-
dant to receive actual notice from the victim.0 3 Second, the court
291. See Richardson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 491, 496, 489 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ct.
App. 1997).
292. Hines, 39 Va. App. at 755, 576 S.E.2d at 782.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 755-57, 576 S.E.2d at 783-84.
295. Id.
296. 39 Va. App. 601, 575 S.E.2d 579 (Ct. App. 2003).
297. Id. at 605, 575 S.E.2d at 581.
298. Id. at 605, 575 S.E.2d at 580-81 (emphasis removed).
299. Id. at 609-10, 575 S.E.2d at 583.
300. 39 Va. App. 522, 574 S.E.2d 756 (Ct. App. 2003).
301. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-200.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
302. Holsapple, 39 Va. App. at 534-35, 574 S.E.2d at 761-62.
303. Id.
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concluded that work that is so poor as to render a dwelling unsafe
or uninhabitable could constitute a failure to perform." 4 Finally,
the court of appeals held that the trial court properly considered
building code violations in determining that the workmanship
was faulty." 5
E. Driving Related Offenses
In Oliver v. Commonwealth, °6 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the Commonwealth was not required to obtain a blood
test from a defendant who had rendered himself unconscious by
his consumption of alcohol. °7 The court noted that the defendant
did not contest the finding that he was intoxicated when he was
arrested and he demonstrated no prejudice from the failure to
take the blood test.30 ' In a noteworthy concurrence, Judge Hum-
phreys wrote separately to stress his conclusion that the plain
language of the implied consent statute "does not obligate an ar-
resting officer to elect to conduct any chemical testing ... [but]
merely provides that a suspect is deemed to have consented to
such tests and establishes certain guidelines for testing in the
event the testing option is utilized."0 9
In another D.U.I. case, Williams v. Commonwealth,31 ° the de-
fendant was arrested and charged with D.U.I., second offense.31
Before his trial on that charge, he was again arrested and
charged with a D.U.I., third offense.312 He argued that he could
not be punished with a D.U.I., third offense, because he had not
yet been convicted of the second offense.1 3 The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed his conviction for the D.U.I., third offense, rea-
soning that the unambiguous statutory language of Virginia Code
section 18.2-270 authorized such punishment. 4 In addition, the
304. Id. at 537, 574 S.E.2d at 763. In Holsapple, the building inspector informed the
victim that her house was uninhabitable due to faulty workmanship. Id. at 531, 574
S.E.2d at 760.
305. Id. at 537, 574 S.E.2d at 763.
306. 40 Va. App. 20, 577 S.E.2d 514 (Ct. App. 2003).
307. Id. at 24, 577 S.E.2d at 516.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 28, 577 S.E.2d at 518 (Humphreys, J., concurring).
310. 265 Va. 268, 576 S.E.2d 468 (2003).
311. Id. at 270, 576 S.E.2d at 469.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 271-72, 576 S.E.2d at 470.
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court said that to hold otherwise would permit a defendant to vio-
late the statute repeatedly without facing a felony conviction. 15
Such a conclusion would undermine the deterrence rationale of
the statute.316
A case with implications for any convictions that require proof
of a predicate offense is Wilson v. Commonwealth.317 In Wilson,
the defendant was charged with driving after having been de-
clared a habitual offender, second or subsequent offense. 31" At
trial, the Commonwealth introduced a certified copy of a warrant
to prove a prior conviction.319 On the warrant, the general district
court made a notation that the defendant pled guilty to a charge
of driving after having been found to be a habitual offender.32 °
However, the warrant failed to memorialize a finding of guilt.321
Wilson argued that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prior
conviction.322 The court held that the notation on the warrant that
the defendant had pled guilty-"'a self-supplied conviction"'-
combined with the sentence imposed, sufficed to prove the prior
conviction.323
Many jurisdictions in Virginia contain federal facilities within
their boundaries. In Campbell v. Commonwealth,324 the defendant
was convicted of driving as a habitual offender, second offense.325
He claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear his
case, because the road on which he traveled was exclusively
within the boundaries of a federal military base.326 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia held that Virginia retains concurrent jurisdic-
tion to prosecute crimes on land ceded to the federal govern-
ment.327 In reaching this conclusion, the court drew from the ces-
sation deed itself and from established sovereignty law.328
Campbell also argued that his arrest occurred on a road that did
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. 40 Va. App. 250, 578 S.E.2d 831 (Ct. App. 2003).
318. Id. at 252, 578 S.E.2d at 832.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 254, 578 S.E.2d at 833.
324. 39 Va. App. 180, 571 S.E.2d 906 (Ct. App. 2002).
325. Id. at 184, 571 S.E.2d at 908.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 191, 571 S.E.2d at 912.
328. Id. at 187-88, 571 S.E.2d at 909-11.
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not constitute a "highway" because it contained gated check-
points.329 The court concluded that even if certain portions of the
road were gated, the defendant was apprehended on the unre-
stricted, public portion of the road.33 ° Therefore, he was traveling
on a "highway" for purposes of Virginia law.33'
In Wright v. Commonwealth,"2 the defendant was convicted of
maiming as a result of driving while intoxicated under Virginia
Code section 18.2-51.4. 333 Wright argued that the prosecution
could not rely on proof of his intoxication "to establish that he
drove in a manner so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a
reckless disregard for human life."334 The Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia relied on well-established definitions of criminal negligence
to resolve the issue. 335 The court held that while intoxication does
not establish reckless driving, it is a factor that might bear upon
proof of dangerous or reckless driving.336 Moreover, the intoxica-
tion is relevant in establishing the degree of the defendant's neg-
ligence, which "increas[es] with the level of intoxication."3 7 Ulti-
mately, the court held that the evidence of intoxication combined
with the defendant's admission that he was driving his car "'too
fast"' were sufficient to show that his actions constituted gross,
culpable, and wanton misconduct.
3 1
F. Obstruction of Justice / Witness Tampering
In a case of first impression, Law v. Commonwealth,339 the
Court of Appeals of Virginia was called upon to interpret Virginia
Code section 18.2-441.1, which prohibits offering money or some-
thing of value to prevent that person from testifying and also
prohibits offering money or something of value to influence some-
one into testifying falsely. 4 In Law, the defendant's friend had
329. Id. at 186, 571 S.E.2d at 909.
330. Id. at 190-91, 571 S.E.2d at 911-12.
331. Id. at 190, 571 S.E.2d at 912.
332. 39 Va. App. 698, 576 S.E.2d 242 (Ct. App. 2003).
333. Id. at 700, 576 S.E.2d at 243.
334. Id. at 702, 576 S.E.2d at 244.
335. Id. at 702-03, 576 S.E.2d at 244.
336. Id. at 704, 576 S.E.2d at 244.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 704-05, 576 S.E.2d at 245.
339. 39 Va. App. 154, 571 S.E.2d 893 (Ct. App. 2002).
340. Id. at 158, 571 S.E.2d at 895.
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been charged with sexual assault.341 Prior to the preliminary
hearing, Law approached the mother of the complaining witness
and offered her "'$500 to squash [the case], to keep the white man
out of it.' 342 The court first concluded that the targeted person
under the statute need not be a witness.343 However, the court
held that the defendant's statement to the complaining witness's
mother did not demonstrate an intent to induce her not to testify
or to testify falsely. 44 The court said that even if the statement
constituted a request to dismiss the charge, such behavior would
not qualify under twin prohibitions of Virginia Code section 18.2-
441. 1.345
G. Threatening Letters
In Keyes v. Commonwealth,346 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
addressed several issues relating to the prohibition against
threatening letters." v First, the court noted that an inmate who
used the institutional mail had, in fact, "sent the letter or pro-
cured its sending."34 The intended recipient of the letter, identi-
fied in the letter as a "Target," was a woman whom Keyes had at-
tempted to rape.349 Keyes made crass statements in the letter that
implied that the target would be raped in the future, and he
signed the letter "The Nightmare Child."35 ° The court held that
this evidence sufficed to demonstrate that the letter was threat-
ening. 5'
H. Trespass
In Virginia v. Hicks,352 the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed and remanded the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision
341. Id. at 156, 571 S.E.2d at 894.
342. Id. (alteration in original).
343. Id. at 159, 571 S.E.2d at 895.
344. Id. at 159-60, 571 S.E.2d at 895-96.
345. Id. at 160, 571 S.E.2d at 896.
346. 39 Va. App. 294, 572 S.E.2d 512 (Ct. App. 2002).
347. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
348. Keyes, 39 Va. App. at 301, 572 S.E.2d at 516.
349. Id. at 301-02, 572 S.E.2d at 516.
350. Id. at 302, 572 S.E.2d at 516.
351. Id.
352. 123 S. Ct. 2191 (2003).
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in Commonwealth v. Hicks.35 The Supreme Court of Virginia had
concluded that a barment policy developed by a public housing
development was overbroad and violated the defendant's First
Amendment rights.354 The Supreme Court of the United States
held that the defendant had failed to show that the barment pol-
icy was "substantially overbroad judged in relation to its plainly
legitimate sweep."355 Hicks, the Court observed, was not punished
for any expressive conduct, such as leafleting or demonstrating.356
The Court also found that the housing authority had applied the
rules to all those who sought entry on the property, "not just to
those who seek to engage in expression."5 7 The Court left open
any challenges to the conviction "on other grounds." 58
IV. EVIDENCE
There have been a number of published and unpublished deci-
sions relating to evidence in some fashion. A few cases are par-
ticularly noteworthy and will be briefly discussed here.
A. Admissibility of a Child's Testimony by Television
In Parrish v. Commonwealth,359 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia considered a challenge to the application of Virginia Code
section 18.2-67.9 (permitting a court to order that testimony of a
child be taken by closed-circuit television under certain condi-
tions).36 ° The court, applying the standard set forth in Maryland
v. Craig,361 in which a similar Maryland statute was upheld,362
found that the Commonwealth met its burden under the statute
and made an adequate showing of necessity for the procedure.363
The court of appeals noted that, based on the record, it could not
353. 264 Va. 48, 563 S.E.2d 674 (2002).
354. Id. at 60, 563 S.E.2d at 681.
355. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. at 2198.
356. Id. at 2199.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. 38 Va. App. 607, 567 S.E.2d 576 (Ct. App. 2002).
360. Id. at 609, 567 S.E.2d at 577.
361. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
362. Id. at 860.
363. Parrish, 38 Va. App. at 613, 567 S.E.2d at 579.
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find that the trial court erred.3" The trial court determined that
the evidence showed that there was a "substantial likelihood"
that the child victim "would suffer severe emotional trauma" if
forced to testify in the presence of the defendant.36
B. Public's Right to Access and Re-test DNA
In Globe Newspaper Company v. Commonwealth,366 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia rejected the newspapers' claims that they
had a right to have access to biological samples from a concluded
criminal case. 367 The newspapers alleged, among other things,
that under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and under Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution
of Virginia, the public had a right to access and re-test DNA evi-
dence from a completed capital murder case where the defendant
had already been executed.368 The court found that the newspa-
pers sought the biological material in order to have it re-tested
and generate a new report so as to create new evidence. 369 Thus,
the court reasoned that the "access" sought was access to evi-
dence that did not exist.370 The Supreme Court of Virginia con-
cluded that there was no constitutional error and that the trial
court properly denied access to the biological material.37'
C. Admissibility of Expert's "Blood Spatter Analysis"
In Smith v. Commonwealth, 2 the Supreme Court of Virginia
ruled that an expert witness's rebuttal testimony about "blood
spatter analysis" was properly admitted in the defendant's first-
degree murder trial.373 The court found that such testimony was
"'a well-recognized discipline, based upon the laws of physics."""
364. Id. at 614-15, 567 S.E.2d at 579.
365. Id. at 614, 567 S.E.2d at 579.
366. 264 Va. 622, 570 S.E.2d 809 (2002).
367. Id. at 631, 570 S.E.2d at 813.
368. Id. at 628, 570 S.E.2d at 811.
369. Id. at 628-29, 570 S.E.2d at 812.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 630, 570 S.E.2d at 813.
372. 265 Va. 250, 576 S.E.2d 465 (2003).
373. Id. at 255, 576 S.E.2d at 468.
374. Id. at 252-53, 576 S.E.2d at 467 (quoting State v. Rodgers, 812 P.2d 1208, 1212
(Idaho 1991)).
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D. Admissibility of Sexual-Assault Victim's Diary
In Cairns v. Commonwealth,"' the defendant attempted to in-
troduce one of the victim's journals to attack her credibility dur-
ing his trial for three counts of forcible sodomy, rape, and produc-
ing sexually explicit material.376 The Court of Appeals of Virginia,
reviewing the trial court's decision to exclude the journals, found
that the documents should have been admitted to impeach the
victim.377 The diaries discussed sexual encounters, but made no
mention of sexual acts perpetrated by the defendant.37 Neverthe-
less, the court held that any error in failing to admit the diaries
was harmless. 9
E. Standard of Review in Appeal of Conviction
In Commonwealth v. Hudson,"' the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed a court of appeals' decision and found that the evidence
was sufficient to convict the defendant of second-degree murder of
his wife and a related firearms offense.38 ' The supreme court dis-
cussed, at length, the burden of proof at trial in a criminal case
and the appellate standard of review once a defendant is con-
victed 2.3 " The supreme court noted that the court of appeals erro-
neously viewed the evidence in the "light most favorable" to the
defendant rather than to the Commonwealth, which is the re-
quired standard on appeal.8 3 Finally, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia examined the Commonwealth's burden relating to "exclu-
sion of reasonable theories of innocence," noting that it only needs
to exclude those "advanced by the accused at trial."38 4
375. 40 Va. App. 271, 579 S.E.2d 340 (Ct. App. 2003).
376. Id. at 286, 579 S.E.2d at 347.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. 265 Va. 505, 578 S.E.2d 781 (2003).
381. Id. at 517, 578 S.E.2d at 787-88.
382. Id. at 512-16, 578 S.E.2d at 785-87.
383. Id. at 514, 578 S.E.2d at 786.
384. Id.
20031
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
V. OTHER INCIDENTS OF TRIAL
A. Prosecutorial Conduct
Appellate courts addressed prosecutorial conduct in a number
of cases. In Morrissette v. Commonwealth,"5 the defendant faced
trial following a DNA "cold hit" nineteen years after the alleged
rape and murder occurred.386 He argued that this delay precluded
him from obtaining corroborating witnesses in support of his al-
ibi.387 The Supreme Court of Virginia explained that the Sixth
Amendment speedy trial clause was not at issue because the de-
lay occurred pre-indictment.8 8 Instead, the defendant could gain
relief under the Due Process Clause if he could show: (1) that the
prosecution intentionally delayed charging him to gain a tactical
advantage; and (2) actual prejudice. 9 The court affirmed the
convictions, holding that the defendant could not establish the
first part of this test.39°
In Leonard v. Commonwealth,39' the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia addressed the issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness.392 The
defendant was originally charged with rape and abduction with
intent to defile.393 The prosecution threatened to bring an addi-
tional attempted murder charge if Leonard did not plead guilty.
394
The court, in accord with Supreme Court of the United States
precedent, held that a prosecutor may generally threaten to file
more severe charges to induce a guilty plea.395 Such threats do not
amount to vindictiveness if the prosecution treats the defendant
no 'worse than he would have been if no plea bargain had been
offered."'3 96 The court concluded that the defendant failed to show
actual vindictiveness. 397 The court noted that the fact that an ad-
385. 264 Va. 386, 569 S.E.2d 47 (2002).
386. Id. at 391, 569 S.E.2d at 51.
387. Id. at 392, 569 S.E.2d at 51-52.
388. Id. at 393, 569 S.E.2d at 52.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. 39 Va. App. 134, 571 S.E.2d 306 (Ct. App. 2002).
392. Id. at 138, 571 S.E.2d at 308.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 139, 571 S.E.2d at 309.
395. Id. at 142-43, 571 S.E.2d at 310-11.
396. Id. at 145, 571 S.E.2d at 312 (quoting United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 658, 662
(4th Cir. 1995)).
397. Id.
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ditional attempted murder indictment was brought only a week
before the previously scheduled trial reflected the schedule of the
grand jury and the timing of the plea negotiations rather than
any vindictiveness.9 s
B. Judicial Recusal
In Jackson v. Commonwealth, 9 the defendant asked a judge
to recuse himself.4 .. The judge had been the Commonwealth's At-
torney when the defendant was previously prosecuted in that ju-
risdiction." 1 The judge declined to recuse himself.40 2 The court of
appeals, sitting en banc, reversed.40 3 The court held that while it
was possible that the judge had no knowledge of the case and
played no part in filing charges or framing trial strategy as the
Commonwealth's Attorney, the case must be reversed because the
record did not establish these facts. 404 Echoing a consistent theme
of recent appellate jurisprudence, the court avoided the adverse
public perception that would be created by the possibility of judi-
cial impropriety.4 5 The Supreme Court of Virginia recently
granted the Commonwealth's appeal of this decision.4 6
C. Jury Issues
1. Jury List
In Butler v. Commonwealth,"' one of the jurors fell ill after
opening statements.4 8 However, a trial in an adjacent courtroom
was canceled and the Commonwealth proposed using that jury
panel for the defendant's trial.40 9 Butler claimed, among other
398. Id. at 145-46, 571 S.E.2d at 312.
399. 40 Va. App. 343, 579 S.E.2d 375 (Ct. App. 2003).
400. Id. at 345, 579 S.E.2d at 376.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 349, 579 S.E.2d at 377.
404. Id. at 348, 579 S.E.2d at 377.
405. Id.
406. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 343, 579 S.E.2d 375, appeal docketed, No.
030749 (Va. Sept. 8, 2003).
407. 264 Va. 614, 570 S.E.2d 813 (2002).
408. Id. at 616, 570 S.E.2d at 814.
409. Id.
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things, that he was entitled to a continuance because he had not
received a copy of the jury panel list forty-eight hours before
trial.41 ° The trial court refused to grant the continuance and the
court of appeals affirmed.411 The court of appeals acknowledged
that Virginia Code section 8.01-353 provides that counsel "shall"
be provided with a copy of the jury panel forty-eight hours before
trial.412 However, the court found that this language is directory
rather than mandatory.4 13 In addition, the defendant could show
no prejudice.414
2. Juror Inattention to a Voir Dire Question
Jurors occasionally fail to answer a question posed during voir
dire. In Blevins v. Commonwealth,415 the defendant discovered af-
ter he was convicted of malicious wounding, abduction, and object
sexual penetration1 6 that one of the jurors failed to disclose that
she had been the victim of a robbery approximately fifteen years
earlier.417 The court conducted a hearing and examined the ju-
ror.41 ' The juror explained that her failure to answer the question
was inadvertent.419 She also said that this prior experience did
not affect her impartiality.2 The trial court credited her testi-
mony and denied a motion for a mistrial.42' The court of appeals
gave deference to this finding and concluded that such honest
mistakes will not provide grounds for a mistrial if the juror's im-
partiality was not implicated. 2
410. Id. at 617, 570 S.E.2d at 814.
411. Id. at 616, 570 S.E.2d at 814.
412. Id. at 619, 570 S.E.2d at 816.
413. Id. at 619-20, 570 S.E.2d at 816.
414. Id. at 620, 570 S.E.2d at 817.
415. 40 Va. App. 412, 579 S.E.2d 658 (Ct. App. 2003).
416. Id. at 418, 579 S.E.2d at 661.
417. Id. at 419-20, 579 S.E.2d at 662.
418. Id. at 420, 579 S.E.2d at 662.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 429-30, 579 S.E.2d at 666-67.
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3. Juror Misconduct
In Evans v. Commonwealth,423 the trial judge questioned a ju-
ror after trial concerning a conversation the juror had with one of
the defendant's relatives.424 The juror denied that such a conver-
sation had occurred.4 25 Evans later filed a motion for a new trial
on the basis of juror misconduct.426 In support of the motion, he
attached an affidavit from the same juror that related a conversa-
tion between the juror and the defendant's uncle.427 The juror
stated that he had learned damaging information about the de-
fendant, such as the fact that the defendant was "'always in trou-
ble,"' was 'slick"' and that the defendant's uncle hoped the defen-
dant would receive a "'forty year[]' sentence.42 The Common-
wealth filed a conflicting affidavit from-yet again-the same ju-
ror in which the juror denied hearing any damaging details. 29
The trial court heard arguments on the defendant's motion for a
mistrial, but denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.43 °
The court of appeals held that the allegations in the defense affi-
davit, if true, would constitute grounds for a mistrial.431 The court
explained that a mistrial would have been appropriate because
the defendant might have been prejudiced.432 The court noted
"'that only slight evidence of influence or prejudice as a result of
such misconduct of a juror should be required to warrant the
granting of a new trial.' 4 33 Second, the court held that under such
circumstances, a trial court must investigate further and conduct
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether any misconduct oc-
curred. 4 The failure to do so constituted reversible error.435
423. 39 Va. App. 229, 572 S.E.2d 481 (Ct. App. 2002).
424. Id. at 233, 572 S.E.2d at 483.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. (quoting Evans Aft. 1 2).
429. Id. at 234, 572 S.E.2d at 483.
430. Id. at 235, 572 S.E.2d at 483-84.
431. Id. at 239, 572 S.E.2d at 485.
432. Id. at 239, 572 S.E.2d at 486.
433. Id. at 238, 572 S.E.2d at 485 (quoting Hickerson v. Burner, 186 Va. 66, 72, 41
S.E.2d 451, 454 (1947)).
434. Id. at 239-40, 572 S.E.2d at 486.
435. Id. at 240, 572 S.E.2d at 486.
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4. Public Perception
A number of appellate decisions addressed the requirement
that jury selection must ensure public confidence in the integrity
of the judicial process. In Patterson v. Commonwealth,436 the court
of appeals held that a defendant can raise, for the first time on
appeal, the adverse public perception effect of permitting a par-
ticular person to sit on a jury.437 The court further concluded that
a juror who had been a police officer for forty-three years,438 who
had conversed with members of the sheriffs department concern-
ing the specific case upon which he sat as a juror, and who ini-
tially expressed concern about his impartiality, should have been
removed for cause. 9 This is so despite the trial court's finding
that the juror would be impartial. 440 The court relied on the ra-
tionale that permitting a juror to hear the case given the circum-
stances would undermine the public confidence in the judicial
process." 1
In contrast, Perez v. Commonwealth 2 was a rape case in which
a juror acknowledged that his daughter had been sexually as-
saulted four years before the instant case."3 However, he did not
initially realize that the detective who participated in the investi-
gation of this case had also investigated his daughter's case.'
When the trial court learned of that fact, it questioned the juror
about his interaction with the detective and made the factual
finding that this juror could be objective." 5 The defendant moved
for a mistrial, but the trial court declined to grant the motion." 6
The court of appeals sustained this ruling."7 The court credited
the trial court's finding of objectivity and held there was no basis
for a per se exclusion; therefore, the public perception did not
compel the exclusion of this juror."8 The court distinguished prior
436. 39 Va. App. 658, 576 S.E.2d 222 (Ct. App. 2003).
437. Id. at 669, 576 S.E.2d at 228.
438. Id. at 660, 576 S.E.2d at 223.
439. Id. at 669, 576 S.E.2d at 228.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. 40 Va. App. 648, 580 S.E.2d 507 (Ct. App. 2003).
443. Id. at 651, 580 S.E.2d at 509.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 651-54, 580 S.E.2d at 509-10.
446. Id. at 653-54, 580 S.E.2d at 510.
447. Id. at 659, 580 S.E.2d at 512.
448. Id. at 656-59, 580 S.E.2d at 510-12.
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cases, noting that the jurors in those cases had a contemporane-
ous or continuing relationship with legal counsel or a witness, a
factor not present in this case. 49
5. Right to a Jury of Twelve
In King v. Commonwealth,"' the court of appeals held that the
Constitution of Virginia affords the Commonwealth, like the de-
fendant, a right to have twelve jurors hear the case.451 In King, a
juror became ill during the trial. 52 The defendant proposed to go
forward with eleven jurors, but the Commonwealth refused. 53
The trial court found that manifest necessity dictated a mis-
trial. 54 King argued that there was no manifest necessity for a
mistrial and, therefore, any subsequent prosecution would be
barred by double jeopardy principles.4 1' The trial court's decision
was affirmed on appeal.456 The court concluded that, in the ab-
sence of the Commonwealth's consent to proceed with fewer than
twelve jurors present, the absence of twelve jurors created a
manifest necessity. 57 Given this manifest necessity, the Double
Jeopardy Clause did not bar subsequent prosecution.458
6. Voir Dire
The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded in Commonwealth v.
Hill459 that, in a non-capital case, neither the defendant nor the
Commonwealth has the right to question the venire concerning
the range of punishments a defendant faces. 60 The court noted
that such questions would only cause the jury to speculate in a
factual vacuum. 61 Furthermore, such questions are not relevant
449. Id. at 658-59, 580 S.E.2d at 512.
450. 40 Va. App. 364, 579 S.E.2d 634 (Ct. App. 2003).
451. Id. at 375, 579 S.E.2d at 640.
452. Id. at 368, 579 S.E.2d at 636.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 369-70, 579 S.E.2d at 637.
455. Id. at 370, 579 S.E.2d at 637.
456. Id. at 377, 579 S.E.2d at 641.
457. Id. at 375-76, 579 S.E.2d at 640.
458. Id. at 376, 579 S.E.2d at 640.
459. 264 Va. 315, 568 S.E.2d 673 (2002).
460. Id. at 319, 568 S.E.2d at 676.
461. Id.
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to the voir dire factors outlined in Virginia Code section 8.01-358,
which address opinions about the cause, or bias, or prejudice.462
D. Juvenile Issues
In Rodriguez v. Commonwealth,46 a juvenile defendant was
charged with second-degree murder.464 In accord with Virginia
Code section 16.1-269.1, the juvenile and domestic relations
court, after making a determination of probable cause, certified
the case to the circuit court without a transfer hearing.465 Rodri-
guez objected, arguing that he was entitled as a matter of consti-
tutional law to a transfer hearing to determine whether he should
be treated as an adult.466 The court of appeals rejected the defen-
dant's argument that he had a constitutional right to such a
transfer hearing.467 The court relied on prior Supreme Court of
Virginia holdings, stating that a juvenile is not entitled to a
transfer hearing. 468 The court of appeals found no cases holding
that such a proceeding is constitutionally mandated.469
The defendant in Hughes v. Commonwealth47 ° was charged
with malicious wounding and the case was certified to the circuit
court pursuant to Virginia Code section 16.1-269.1(C).471 That sec-
tion lists certain violent offenses that, once certified to the circuit
court, divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction.472 Hughes x7as ul-
timately convicted of unlawful wounding, which is not one of the
violent felonies enumerated in Virginia Code section 16.1-
269.1(C).7 3 Hughes argued that "when a juvenile is transferred
pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(C) ... the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court is not divested if the violent juvenile felony is later
dismissed or reduced to a lesser-included offense which is not one
462. Id.
463. 40 Va. App. 144, 578 S.E.2d 78 (Ct. App. 2003).
464. Id. at 148, 578 S.E.2d at 79.
465. Id. at 149, 578 S.E.2d at 80.
466. Id. at 150, 578 S.E.2d at 80.
467. Id. at 149, 578 S.E.2d at 80.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 153-54, 578 S.E.2d at 82. For additional discussion of certification and
other juvenile issues in Virginia, see Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Legal Issues Involving Children, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 161, 169-82 (2003).
470. 39 Va. App. 448, 573 S.E.2d 324 (Ct. App. 2002).
471. Id. at 452, 573 S.E.2d at 325.
472. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
473. Hughes, 39 Va. App. at 452, 573 S.E.2d at 325.
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of the enumerated violent juvenile felonies."474 The court of ap-
peals disagreed, holding that, under the plain language of the
statute, once the juvenile court has certified the charge it is di-
vested of jurisdiction.47 The statute "makes no provision for any
[remaining] dormant jurisdiction" that can be revived later.476
Finally, in B.P. v. Commonwealth,477 the court of appeals af-
firmed the broad authority of a juvenile court to ensure crime
prevention and juvenile rehabilitation.47 The juvenile court found
that the child was in need of supervision because she was habitu-
ally absent from school.479 The court directed the preparation of a
report on the child's needs and also ordered the child to attend
school.4"' When she did not, the court found her in contempt and
sentenced her to ten days in the juvenile detention center.48 The
juvenile appealed, arguing that the court lacked the authority to
order her to attend school.8 2 She relied upon Virginia Code sec-
tion 16.1-278.5 for her argument that the court lacked the author-
ity to issue the order.48 3 She asserted that the court could issue
such an order only after filing an agency report assessing her
needs.8 4 The court of appeals did not agree with this argument.4 5
The court held that the Virginia Code grants juvenile courts
broad authority in such matters and nothing in the present situa-
tion divested the court of the authority to issue such an interlocu-
tory order.48 6 The court also reasoned that it would be "absurd" to
permit a juvenile, already found to be habitually absent from
school, to continue to avoid compulsory school attendance.4 7
474. Id. at 454-55, 573 S.E.2d at 327.
475. Id. at 458, 573 S.E.2d at 328.
476. Id. at 459, 573 S.E.2d at 329.
477. 38 Va. App. 735, 568 S.E.2d 412 (Ct. App. 2002).
478. See id. at 737, 568 S.E.2d at 412.
479. Id. For additional discussion of juveniles and school authority, see Shepherd, su-
pra note 469, at 177.
480. B.P., 38 Va. App. at 737, 568 S.E.2d at 412-13.
481. Id. at 737, 568 S.E.2d at 413.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 738, 568 S.E.2d at 413.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 738-39, 568 S.E.2d at 413-14.
487. Id. at 739, 568 S.E.2d at 414.
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E. Severing Charges
The court of appeals previously held that, in a jury trial, a
charge of felon in possession of a firearm must be severed and
tried separately from other charges to avoid any unfair prejudice
to the defendant.4"' In Vanhook v. Commonwealth, 9 the court of
appeals held that when this scenario occurs in a bench trial, the
felon in possession of a firearm charges need not be severed. 49o A
judge, unlike a jury, has the training and experience to avoid the
prejudice that might affect a jury's perception stemming from the
knowledge that the defendant had been previously convicted of a
felony.491
VI. SENTENCING
Most cases in the area of sentencing and punishment are very
fact-driven and specific. Often they are not particularly useful in
the context of application to other cases. However, there are a few
recently decided cases in this area that will be noted.
In McCullough v. Commonwealth,492 the Court of Appeals of
Virginia found that the trial court did not err when it ordered res-
titution in an amount greater than the amount proved in the guilt
phase of trial.493 This was a question of first impression in Vir-
ginia and the Supreme Court of Virginia awarded an appeal from
the decision of the court of appeals.494
In Cuffee-Smith v. Commonwealth,495 the Court of Appeals of
Virginia found that where a defendant is required to serve a
mandatory minimum sentence-in this case, the second or subse-
quent offense of driving after having been declared an habitual
offender 49 -- that defendant is ineligible for electronic home moni-
toring, as permitted under Virginia Code section 53.1-131.2, for
488. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 49, 56, 455 S.E.2d 261, 265 (Ct.
App. 1995).
489. 40 Va. App. 130, 578 S.E.2d 71 (Ct. App. 2003).
490. Id. at 136, 578 S.E.2d at 73-74.
491. Id. at 134-35, 578 S.E.2d at 73.
492. 38 Va. App. 811, 568 S.E.2d 449 (Ct. App. 2002).
493. Id. at 814, 568 S.E.2d at 450.
494. McCullough v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 811, 568 S.E.2d 449, appeal docketed,
No. 022250 (Va. Jan. 8, 2003).
495. 39 Va. App. 476, 574 S.E.2d 294 (Ct. App. 2002).
496. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-357 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
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the duration of the mandatory minimum sentence.497 The court
relied on the plain language of the statute in reaching this con-
clusion.498
VII. POST TRIAL/REVOCATIONS
Virginia Code section 19.2-295.2 generally authorizes a trial
court, subject to certain limitations, to impose a term of post re-
lease supervision in addition to any incarceration.499 In Lamb v.
Commonwealth, °° the trial court sought to impose such a term of
post-release supervision following a revocation proceeding, rather
than after a criminal trial."' The court of appeals concluded that
Virginia Code section 19.2-295.2 can only be employed following
the original judgment of conviction. 502 The imposition of an addi-
tional term of post-release supervision following a revocation con-
stituted error.0 3
In Leitao v. Commonwealth,0 4 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reviewed the actions of a trial court that had repeatedly revoked
portions of a suspended sentence.0 5 During one of the revoca-
tions, the trial court did not explicitly re-suspend the balance of
the original sentence.50 6 This order reimposed only a portion of
the original sentence and returned the defendant to probation fol-
lowing his release from prison.50 7 The court concluded that this
failure to explicitly re-suspend the balance of the original sen-
tence did not eliminate this balance.5 08 The court deferred to the
trial court's interpretation of its own order and concluded that the
trial court committed no error in later reimposing the remaining
497. Cuffee-Smith, 39 Va. App. at 483, 574 S.E.2d at 297.
498. Id. at 482-83, 574 S.E.2d at 297.
499. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.2 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
500. 40 Va. App. 52, 577 S.E.2d 530 (Ct. App. 2003).
501. Id. at 55, 577 S.E.2d at 531.
502. Id. at 57, 577 S.E.2d at 532.
503. Id. at 58, 577 S.E.2d at 533.
504. 39 Va. App. 435, 573 S.E.2d 317 (Ct. App. 2002).
505. Id. at 436-37, 573 S.E.2d at 318.
506. Id. at 437, 573 S.E.2d at 318.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 438, 573 S.E.2d at 319.
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balance of the sentence. 0 9 This remaining balance, the court of
appeals concluded, was implicitly suspended by the prior order.51°
The court of appeals addressed a related issue in McFarland v.
Commonwealth.51 In that 1995 case, the trial court sentenced the
defendant to a term of ten years, all suspended, for possessing a
sawed-off shotgun and pointing a gun at two deputies. 1'2 The trial
court also ordered supervised probation." 3 McFarland was
"[o]rdered to keep the peace [and] be of good behavior."14 McFar-
land complied with the terms of his supervised probation, which
the court terminated in 1996, again on the condition that he be of
good behavior.515 In 2001, McFarland desired to enlist in the
armed services and sought to modify the 1995 order to eliminate
the requirement that he be of good behavior. 6 The trial court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the defendant's re-
quest.1 7 The court of appeals agreed. 18 The court held that Vir-
ginia Code section 19.2-304 authorizes a court to alter the condi-
tions of probation.519 However, the statute does not confer this
authority with respect to the conditions of a suspended sen-
tence. 520 Therefore, the passage of more than twenty-one days af-
ter the entry of the final order deprived the trial court of jurisdic-
tion to alter the "good behavior" condition of the suspended
sentence.
In Miles v. Sheriff of the Virginia Beach City Jail,5 22 a habeas
corpus case with sweeping implications for the volume of criminal
appeals, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that even
though a defendant pled guilty, if he timely and clearly instructed
his attorney to appeal, the attorney must appeal.523 A failure to
appeal under those circumstances amounts to ineffective assis-
509. Id. at 439, 573 S.E.2d at 319.
510. Id. at 438, 573 S.E.2d at 319.
511. 39 Va. App. 511, 574 S.E.2d 311 (Ct. App. 2002).
512. Id. at 513, 574 S.E.2d at 312.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 513-14, 574 S.E.2d at 312.
517. Id. at 513, 574 S.E.2d at 312.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 515, 574 S.E.2d at 313.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 517, 574 S.E.2d at 314.
522. 266 Va. 110, 581 S.E.2d 191 (2003).
523. Id. at 112, 581 S.E.2d at 192.
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tance of counsel.524 The court rejected the respondent's argument
that the narrow range of issues that can be appealed following a
guilty plea required a habeas petitioner to identify a viable appel-
late issue.52 Of course, if there are only frivolous issues to appeal,
counsel should file an Anders brief.5 26
VIII. LEGISLATION
A. Capital Litigation
Following the decision in Atkins v. Virginia,527 prohibiting the
execution of the mentally retarded,528 the General Assembly en-
acted legislation that defines mental retardation, establishes pro-
cedures for determining whether a defendant meets the defini-
tion, and establishes procedures for the appointment of experts to
conduct the evaluation. 29 The finding of mental retardation is a
factual determination to be made by the jury, or the judge in a
bench trial.53 ° The defendant bears the burden of establishing re-
tardation by a preponderance of the evidence. 3' Virginia Code
section 8.01-654.2 also creates a procedure to raise such claims
for persons sentenced to death prior to the Atkins decision. 2 Fi-
nally, during the course of the sentencing proceeding, the Com-
monwealth cannot use any statements that the defendant makes
while being evaluated.533
524. Id. at 115-16, 581 S.E.2d at 194.
525. Id. at 116, 581 S.E.2d at 195.
526. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also Brown v. Warden, 238 Va. 551,
385 S.E.2d 587 (1989); Kuzminski v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 106, 378 S.E.2d 632 (Ct.
App. 1989).
527. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). For a more extensive discussion of the Atkins decision, see
Jaime L. Henshaw, Note, Atkins v. Virginia, The Court's Failure to Recognize What Lies
Beneath, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185 (2003).
528. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
529. Act of May 1, 2003, ch. 1040, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-654.2 (Cum. Supp. 2003); id. §§ 19.2-264.3:1.1, -264.3:1.2, -264.3:1.3 (Cum.
Supp. 2003)).
530. VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
531. Id.
532. Id. § 8.01-654.2 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
533. Id. § 19.2-264.3:3 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
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B. Identification
Following on the heels of anti-terrorist legislation enacted over
the past few years, the General Assembly created a Class 6 felony
offense for those who obtain Department of Motor Vehicles docu-
ments through the use of counterfeit, forged, or altered docu-
ments.534 The law also restricts the issuance of such documents to
United States citizens or those legally present in the country. 35
In addition, the law imposes more stringent requirements for ob-
taining licenses, permits, and identification cards. 36
C. Alcohol
A front-page article in Lawyer's Weekly brought attention to an
unpublished order by the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Dalton v.
Commonwealth, 3' which reversed the finding of the circuit court
that the court had jurisdiction in an underage possession of alco-
hol case.53 The juvenile was found intoxicated in an automobile
but not in "possession" of an alcoholic beverage. 39 The difficulty
arose in establishing where the juvenile had possessed the alco-
hol.540 In response, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code
section 4.1-305, which now permits the prosecution "either in the
county or city in which the alcohol was possessed or consumed, or
in the county or city in which the person exhibits evidence of
physical indicia of consumption of alcohol."541 The General As-
sembly also changed the law requiring a court to dismiss DUI or
refusal proceedings against a juvenile if: (1) the license has been
restored; (2) the terms and conditions imposed have been met;
and (3) the violation did not result in death or injury of any per-
son.542 Now, the courts will have the discretion to dismiss such
534. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 819, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.2-105.2 (Supp. 2003)).
535. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-328.1 (Supp. 2003).
536. Id. Portions of this legislation become effective on January 1, 2004 and others be-
come effective on July 1, 2004. Id.
537. No. 1466-01-3, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 113 (Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2002) (unpublished
order).
538. John D. Tuerck, Jurisdiction Is Key in DUI 'Possession' Case, VA. LAW. WKLY.,
Feb. 18, 2002, at 1.
539. Id. at 13.
540. Id. at 1.
541. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 845, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 4.1-305(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
542. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 118, 2003 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
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proceedings.543 Finally, the legislature eliminated the require-
ment that police officers provide the accused with information
concerning how to obtain an independent analysis of the second
vial of blood.544
D. Drugs / Tobacco
The General Assembly altered the punishment for persons who
possess firearms while possessing a Schedule I or II drug. Previ-
ously, all such cases required a mandatory minimum term of in-
carceration of three years."' Under the amendments to Virginia
Code section 18.2-308.4: (1) constructive possession of a firearm
while possessing drugs is a Class 6 felony with no mandatory
minimum;5 46 (2) possession of a firearm on or about the person
while possessing drugs constitutes a Class 6 felony with a manda-
tory minimum punishment of two years;547 and finally, (3) one
who possesses drugs and uses, displays, or attempts to use a fire-
arm is guilty of a Class 6 felony and faces a mandatory minimum
of five years.54S
A defendant no longer must intend to distribute the drugs on or
near school property to fall under the strictures of Virginia Code
section 18.2-255.2."' 9 This amendment to the law effectively re-
verses the Court of Appeals of Virginia's decision in Toliver v.
Commonwealth,5 1 which concluded that a defendant must intend
to sell the drugs within 1,000 feet of the school zone to be con-
victed under this provision.55'
The legislature also minted a new crime, prohibiting the sale or
purchase of "wrappings" to minors.5 '2 The new legislation defined
ANN. § 16.1-278.9 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
543. See id.
544. Act of Mar. 24, 2003, ch. 936, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-268.6 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
545. Act of Mar. 24, 2003, ch. 949, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-308.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
546. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
547. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
548. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.4(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
549. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 80, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-255.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
550. 38 Va. App. 27, 561 S.E.2d 743 (Ct. App. 2002).
551. Id. at 33-34, 561 S.E.2d at 746.
552. Act of Mar. 18, 2003, ch. 615, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-371.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
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wrappings to include papers made for rolling tobacco.553 The Gen-
eral Assembly also amended Virginia Code section 18.2-371.2 to
prohibit the attempted purchase, as well as the completed pur-
chase, of tobacco products by a minor. 54
E. Parental Neglect Defense
Press reports nationwide and in Virginia have highlighted the
problem of newborn infants who are abandoned by their birth
mother. To offer an incentive for the mother to leave the child in a
safe place, the legislature created an affirmative defense to a
prosecution for child neglect for a parent who leaves a child no
older than fourteen days old with a hospital or rescue squad."55
The affirmative defense only immunizes the act of abandoning
the infant, rather than any other abuse the child may have been
subjected to at the hands of that parent. 556
F. Indictments
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 18.2-111
to provide that proof of embezzlement is sufficient to sustain a
conviction for larceny.5 7 This legislation nullifies the holding in
Bruhn v. Commonwealth,55 which held that the Commonwealth's
proof of embezzlement did not establish the charged offense of
larceny.559
553. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.2(H) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
554. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 114, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-371.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
555. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 822, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-371 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
556. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (Cure. Supp. 2003). For additional discussion of child
neglect and abuse issues in Virginia over the past year, see Shepherd, supra note 469, at
186-90.
557. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 733, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
558. 37 Va. App. 537, 559 S.E.2d 880 (Ct. App. 2002).
559. Id. at 546-47, 559 S.E.2d at 885. For an extensive analysis of the Bruhn decision
and the General Assembly's reaction, see John G. Douglass, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Rethinking Theft Crimes in Virginia, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 13 (2003).
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G. Resisting Arrest
The legislature fashioned a new offense of resisting arrest.
Under Virginia Code section 18.2-479.1, someone "who intention-
ally prevents or attempts to prevent a law-enforcement officer
from lawfully arresting him,... is guilty of a Class 1 misde-
meanor." 6 ' The law defines "intentionally preventing or attempt-
ing to prevent a lawful arrest" as:
fleeing from a law-enforcement officer when (i) the offi-
cer applies physical force to the person, or (ii) the officer
communicates to the person that he is under arrest and
(a) the officer has the legal authority and the immediate
physical ability to place the person under arrest, and (b)
a reasonable person who receives such communication
knows or should know that he is not free to leave. 561
H. Sex Crimes
Extensive media coverage of the impending release of an indi-
vidual convicted of violent sexual offenses prompted passage of
legislation permitting the civil commitment of "[s]exually violent
predators."562 The effective date of this previously enacted legisla-
tion was advanced from 2004 to effective from its passage.5 The
law targets prisoners who have been convicted of certain predi-
cate violent sexual offenses. 6 4 The law defines a sexually violent
predator as a person with a qualifying offense who, "because of a
mental abnormality or personality disorder, finds it difficult to
control his predatory behavior."565 The individual must receive a
certain score on a sex offender risk assessment instrument. 66 The
Attorney General must file a petition and prove that the individ-
560. Act of Mar. 20, 2003, ch. 805, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
479.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
561. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-479.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
562. Act of Apr. 2, 2003, ch. 989, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 37.1-70.1 to -70.6, and 37.1-70.9 to -70.16 (Cum. Supp. 2003)). Although civil, the
legislation implicates criminal convictions and is included here.
563. See id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3703 (Cum. Supp. 2003); id.
§§ 37.1-70.1 to -70.6, 37.1-70.9 to -70.16, 37.1-103, 37.1-104, and 37.1-104.1 (Cum. Supp.
2003)).
564. Id.
565. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-70.1 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
566. Id. § 37.1-70.5(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
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ual is a sexual predator by "clear and convincing evidence." 67 The
law restricts the prisoner's ability to challenge his prior convic-
tions.568 Either party can request a civil jury.569 The law restricts
access to discovery in such cases.5 70 Finally, the prisoner's right to
use evidence in his defense is curtailed if he refuses to cooperate
with a mental examination.57'
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,72 the Supreme Court of
the United States struck, on First Amendment grounds, portions
of a federal law prohibiting the possession of certain "virtual"
child pornography images-i.e. computer generated images that
appear to be children.573 In response, the General Assembly en-
acted a proposal by the Attorney General to create a registry of
images.5 74 The registry will assist law enforcement in determining
whether the child pornography images in the possession of a de-
fendant are real or virtual.575
I. Statutory Double Jeopardy
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 19.2-294
to prevent re-prosecution for the "same act."5 76 The prior provision
precluded a prosecution in state court once a federal prosecution
had commenced, with "commenced" defined as "the return of an
indictment by a grand jury or the filing of an information."577
That provision was broadened to provide that a federal prosecu-
tion commences when jeopardy attaches.578
567. Id. § 37.1-70.11(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
568. Id. § 37.1-70.2 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
569. Id. § 37.1-70.9(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
570. Id. § 37.1-70.9(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
571. Id. § 37.1-70.2 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
572. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
573. See id. at 258.
574. Act of Mar. 24, 2003, ch. 938, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
390.3 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
575. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
576. Act of Mar. 19. 2003, ch. 736, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-294 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
577. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
578. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 736, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-294 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
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J. Criminal Investigations / Grand Juries
To combat the growing problem of money laundering, the Gen-
eral Assembly, at the request of the Attorney General, enacted a
provision requiring financial institutions or credit card issuers to
disclose certain records and information pursuant to the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum.579 The legislation also allows financial
institutions to seek to quash or modify unduly burdensome sub-
poenas.518 The General Assembly expanded the power of a grand
jury to enable the grand jury to subpoena "tangible things." 8 '
Also, the number of grand jurors summoned to serve was ex-
panded from seven to nine.582
IX. CONCLUSION
The past year witnessed extensive changes to an ever more
complex body of law. This richness and complexity presents both
daunting challenges and great rewards for the prepared practi-
tioner. Consequently, a wise practitioner will always research
the law before trying a case.
579. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 223, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
10.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
580. Id.
581. Act of Mar. 18, 2003, ch. 565, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-208 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
582. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 825, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-194 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
20031

